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of virtual representation is not properly applied in either case where an actual
beneficial interest exists. Where both approaches are applied without dis-
tinction, as the cases of Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.P and Raffel v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,64 previously discussed, would indicate is the situation
in Maryland, an enactment of statutory rules of construction would appear to
be the only satisfactory solution of the problem.65 If it is desired that only
the consent of those in being should be required for revocation under Sections
23 of the Personal Property Law and 118 of the Real Property Law, those
sections can and should be amended to so provide.
THE PARDONING POWER OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIV.-Typical of the recur-
rence of age-old controversies in constitutional law are the present-day clashes
between the executive and judicial departments of government. During recent
months, public attention has been turned to two concrete examples of this in-
evitable conflict of authority. The first manifestation of antagonism has re-
sulted from the exercise of executive clemency by the Governor of New York,
in the form of commutation of the death penalty to imprisonment for life.
These current grants of executive mercy have been regarded as an encroachment
upon the judiciary.' The resulting issue between the executive and judicial
departments, however, provides an apt illustration of the American system of
"checks" and "balances." But more important than this is the present endeavor
by the Chief Executive of the nation in seeking to remodel the Supreme Tribunal
of the United States. 2 Whether this executive control upon the judicial depart-
ment is to be extended so as to remake the Supreme Court, by creating a "more
liberal personnel," remains to be decided. For present purposes, however, the
significance of this struggle, which has divided public opinion, is that it has
attracted widespread interest to the tripartite powers of government. One
phase of this division of governmental authority-the pardoning power of the
chief executive-will be herein considered.
An outstanding and important feature of the American constitutional system
63. 163 Md. 239, 161 Ati. 404 (1932).
64. 100 Md. 141, 59 At!. 702 (1905).
65. See N. Y. PERs. PR oP. LAw (1911) § 100. This statute provides such rules in relation
to the sale of goods and reads in part as follows: "Unless a different intention appar,
the following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at
which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer."
1. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1937, p. 20, col. 3, wherein it is stated that the Governor
granted executive clemency to seven out of ten slayers sentenced to death during the
preceding two weeks alone. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1937, p. 3, col. 1, in which County
Judge Franklin Taylor strongly criticized the extreme leniency of the Governor in this
respect. See also N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1937, p. 20, col. 3, and N. Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1937, p. 3, col. 2, wherein the Governor replied to his critics with a barrage of statistics,
by contrasting the records of former governors on the question of commutation of sen-
tence with his own record in this regard.
2. See Cong. Rec. Vol. 81, § 25, Feb. 5, 1937, presenting President Roosevelt's executive
message to Congress on the proposed reform of the judiciary.
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is the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government.8
The governments, both state and federal, are divided into three distinct de-
partments to each of which is given the powers and functions appropriate to it.
Thus, a dangerous concentration of power is avoided,4 and the respective powers
are thereby assigned to the agencies best fitted to exercise them.0 This prin-
ciple of the separation of powers has long been recognized as essential to our
free government and to the maintenance of public liberty.0
To preserve equality of dignity and a balance of power among these three
co-ordinate and independent departments of government, each branch has been
vested with various devices of prohibition and control to prevent the inordinate
exercises of power by any one branch. For example, the executive department
is vested with express authority to veto acts of the legislature of which it dis-
approves. 7 And the legislative branch, in turn, is empowered-when emergency
demands-to override an executive veto by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress.8 Finally, the judiciary department of the government is granted
power to check both legislative and executive endeavors, by declaring legislation
void and without effect in law when it is found to be out of harmony with the
fundamental precepts of the Constitution.9 Of course, the power to amend the
Federal Constitution, residing in the people themselves, serves as an ever-
present check upon the judiciary. The question as to whether this ancient
and basic doctrine, so deeply ingrained in the American system of government,
can persevere against the current attack upon the judicial department and con-
tinue to subsist is latent in the present proposal of the President to reform the
Supreme Court.
In General
"A pardon," wrote Chief Justice Marshall, in defining the term within the
3. There is no express provision in the Federal Constitution requiring the separation
of powers, such as is found in some of the state constitutions, but the separation Is ac-
complished by the establishment of the three branches of the government and the dis-
tribution of the various powers among them. Article I establishes the legislative depart-
ment of the national government, and vests with it the legislative powers granted by the
Constitution. In like manner, Articles II and III establish the executive and judicial
departments respectively, and confer upon them their appropriate powers.
4. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or electle,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." See TnE FEnmtALST (1788)
No. XLVII (MADIsoN) 223.
5. For a more exhaustive treatment of the separation-of-powers doctrine in America
and England, see Fairlie, The Separation of Powers (1923) 21 Micu. L. Rav. 393;
Green, Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YAL, L. J. 369; Brown, The
Separation of Powers in British Jurisdictions (1921) 31 YA. L. J. 24.
6. Such a separation was made by the British Constitution also. 1 BL, Comrm. *269.
7. U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 7, ci. 2.
8. U. S. Co NsT. Art. I, § 7, c. 2.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U. S. 388 (1935) (Hot Oil Case); (1935) 4 Fonrom L. REv. 341; A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) (N. R. A. case); Comment (1935)
4 FoRDTax L. REV. 457.
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meaning of the Federal Constitution, "is an act of grace,10 proceeding from the
power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed."' 1 According to Mlontesquieu, in ancient, continental monarchies,
the pardoning power has long resided in the prince of the people.'- In England,
a pardon commonly proceeds from the crown, although they have sometimes
been granted by act of parliament.' 3 The king's royal power was said by our
Saxon ancestors to be derived a lege suae dignitatis.14 In America, the par-
doning prerogative has not only been written into the national Constitution,'
but almost every state, by constitutional provisions and statutory enactments,
has established the exercise of execqtive clemency as a principle of democratic
government. 6
At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, American states-
men were most familiar with the prerogatives exercised by the king, so that
obviously when the words "to grant pardons" were used in the Constitution of
the United States, they conveyed to mind the authority as exercised by the Eng-
lish crown.17 Hence, it may be truly stated that we adopted their principles
respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and relied on the early writings
of the common law for rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be em-
ployed.'8
10. See Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 222, 54 N. E. 678, 679 (1899) (a pardon is
granted not as a matter of right, but of grace); People ez rd. Patrick v. Frost, 133 App.
Div. 179, 183, 117 N. Y. Supp. 524, 528 (2d Dep't 1909) (it does not proceed ort
the theory of innocence, but implies guilt).
11. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160 (U. S. 1833). A pardon was defined:
by Lord Coke simply "as a remission of guilt." 3 CoiE, IsrnTns (6th ed. 1680) 233.
12. See MO.EQuIEu, Snrr or LAws (6th ed. 1793) 57. This author in treating
with the pardoning prerogative termed it "the most glorious attribute of the sovereignty."
Ibid.
13. 1 BIsHoP, NEW Cpm=AL LAW (8th ed. 1892) 544-545; 3 CozE, L';sr n-u (6th
ec. 16S0) 233 et seq.
14. 2 Coor=x, Br.AcxsToxE (4th ed. 1899) 1524. Originally it was said that it must
be under the "Great Seal," to be of itself a complete, irrevocable pardon. Id. at 1527.
But, now on conviction of any felony punishable with death or otherwise, a signed
manual warrant, countersigned by a principal secretary of state, has, on the discharge
of the offender out of custody, or on the performance of the condition in the case of
free and conditional pardons, the same effect as a pardon under the "Great SeaL" 6 HAxs-
BuRY, LAws oF EcOLAND (1909) 404-405.
15. U. S. Corer. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. "... and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment."
16. Morris, Some Piaes of the Pardoning Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. 3. 183, 183; 1
BIsHOP, NEW CRisaAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) 545; 2 SToRY, Cons o.ruo: (5th ed. 1891)
§ 1496. The New York Constitution presents a provision typical of most jurisliction.
See N. Y. CorNsT. art. IV, § 5: "The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cas2s of
impeachment, . . ." See GnsmRT, CoDE or Canr. Paoc. (1936) §§ 692, 693, 694. See
also, note 20, infra.
17. See Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307, 311 (U. S. 1855).
18. See United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 159 (U. S. 1833); .z parte Grozaaan,
1937]
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The power of pardoning offenses against the United States, conferred by the
Constitution upon the president, is practically unlimited, save in cases of im-
peachment. 19 But the corresponding power of executive mercy bestowed upon
the governors of the state sovereignties is substantially limited and restrained
by the express words of their constitutional grants. 20  In case of the impeach-
ment of the governor, or his removal from office, or his absence from the state,
the power to pardon generally devolves upon his direct representative, the
lieutenant-governor. 21  Moreover, the principle is now firmly established in our
jurisprudence that neither the state nor federal legislature can enact laws to re-
strict or encroach upon the executive's pardoning power, for his authority in
relation thereto is supreme.22  Nor may the judiciary trespass upon this essen-
267 U. S. 87, 109 (1925). Nor is there any substantial difference in this matter (pardoning)
between the executive power of pardon in our government and king's prerogative. Ex
parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 113 (1925).
19. U. S. CoNsT. Art. H-, § 2, cl. 1.
20. For a summary of the provisions of the statutes and constitutional provisions
of the several states in regard to pardons, see (1929) 20 J. Came. L. 364 el seq.
It will be observed by comparing the provision of the Federal Constitution with the
provision of the New York Constitution that the governor is limited or modified in four
particulars in the exercise of this power:
1-The president can pardon for treason, the governor cannot.
2-The president can pardon at any time after the commission of the offense,
the governor only after conviction.
3-Congress has no power to prescribe regulations as to the manner of apply-
ing for pardons; the state legislature has such power.
4-The president is not required to report to Congress any case wherein he has
extended executive clemency; the governor is required to do so and to give reasons
for his actions.
The states themselves have withheld from their pardoning depositaries the power to
pardon for the offense of treason, because the exercise thereof would not have been
harmonious with the federal plan of government. See, Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning
Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 183, 187.
21. N. Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Montgomery v. Cleveland, 134 Miss. 132, 98 So. 111
(1923) (in the absence of the governor, the lieutenant-governor is clothed with the power
to grant a plenary pardon); Ex parte Cullens, 11 Oka. Cr. R. 644, 150 Pac. 90 (1915)
(conditional pardon granted by the lieutenant-governor); People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes,
163 App. Div. 725, 149 N. Y. Supp. 250 (3d Dep't 1914) (during the impeachment of
the governor, the power to pardon devolves upon the lieutenant-governor). An apparent
reason for this devolution of power lies in the fact that the granting of pardons is a
function of the state, and not merely the personal act of the governor. Montgomery v.
Cleveland, 134 Miss. 132, 98 So. 111 (1923).
22. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866) (right to practice law, after participation
in the Civil War, restored by presidential pardon, despite attempted legislation to the
contrary); Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall. 154 (U. S. 1871); Snodgrass v. State,
67 Tex. Cr. R. 615, 150 S. W. 162 (1912) (Texas statute allowing judges to suspend
sentence indefinitely, held void as an invasion of the governor's pardoning prerogative).
But, it has sometimes been stated that according to the system of laws whence ours are
derived, a pardon may proceed from either the executive or the legislative department,
the authority of neither being exclusive. 1 BisHop, NEw CR. UNAL LAw (8th ed. 1892)
545; State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74 (1870) (while the power to pardon after conviction is
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tially executive prerogative.ns Freedom from legislative and judicial control
in this field, peculiarly executive in character, presents a concrete application
of the doctrine of the separation of powers, inherent in a democratic form of
government.
Extent of the Pardoning Power
The pardoning prerogative, conferred upon the president, embraces, in the
express words of the Constitution, all "Offenses against the United States, -24
except in cases of Impeachment." 25 This intolerance of executive pardons in im-
peachment cases in America may be ascribed to two factors:-first, there has
been no humane need for an available clemency, such as existed in England, for
here the maximum penalty for impeachment has not exceeded removal from
office and ineligibility to hold other offices; the second factor has been a feel-
ing, founded upon English experience, that if pardons extended to impeach-
ments, the latter might well become wholly ineffective as a protection against
political offenses.
-2 6
Criminal contempts of court have been traditionally treated as being within
this grant, constituting offences against the dignity of the courts of the United
States.27  It has been suggested, however, that criminal contempts constitute
vested in the governor, the exercise of the pardoning power before conviction by the
legislature is not unconstitutional). Furthermore, the pardoning power is not so exclusive
as to prevent other officers, acting under statute, from remitting forfeitures and panalties
incurred from violations of laws of the United States. Pollock v. Bridgeport S. B. Co.
(The Laura), 114 U. S. 411 (1885) (remisson of forfeitures by the secretary of treasury
and other officers has long since been upheld).
23. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925); Ex parte Crump, 10 0ka. Cr. R. 133,
135 Pac. 428 (1913). But, the power to reduce a sentence by judicial amendment is as
much a judicial act as the imposition of the sentence in the first instance, and it is not
a usurpation of the pardoning power of the chief executive. United States v. Benz,
282 U. S. 304 (1930).
24. U. S. CoqsT. Art. II, § 2, ci. 1. The power thus conferred is unlimited; it extends
to every offense known to the law. See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1866);
and, United States v. Thomasson, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,479, at 83 (D. C. Ind. 1869). This
is traceable to the common law of England where it was recognized that the king might
pardon all offenses against the crown or the public, except where private injury was
principally concerned. 2 CooLEY, Br.AcxsroaN (4th ed. 1899) 1525, 1526; IrxLwam, Coi's
A suin r (1813) 351.
25. U. S. Cox-sr. Art. I, § 2, ci. 1, which expressly excepts out of the pardoning
power impeachment cases, and a like exception exists in most state constitutions. 1 Bisnop,
NEw Can=AL LAW (Sth ed. 1892) 554. See note 20, supra. It is the same also by act
of parliament in England. The king's pardon cannot be pleaded to parliamentary im-
peachments so as to impede the inquiry and stop the prosecution of great and notorious
offenders. But, after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is
probable that the king's royal pardon or grace is not further restrained or abridged.
2 CoorLnr, BLAcxsrO- (4th ed. 1S99) 1523, 1526.
26. See Van Hecke, Pardons in Impeachtment Cases (1926) 24 BImem L. RM,. 657,
659-660.
27. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925); United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S.
229 (1928). This same rules applies to the governors of the state sovereignties also.
State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N. Al. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924). Contra: Taylor v. Good-
1937]
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offenses solely against the court, rather than against the United States.28 The
power to proclaim a general pardon and amnesty is directly within the presi-
dent's grant,29 and was frequently invoked to forgive the crime of treason com-
mitted during the Civil War. 0 It has the force and effect of public law.81
The general power to pardon criminal offenses against the sovereignty also in-
cludes the power to pardon conditionally,8 2 and to commute sentence.88 This
rich, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 40 S. W. 515 (1897) (since criminal contempts are not included
in the criminal code of the state, then they do not come under the term "crimes" appearing
in the pardoning clause). The Supreme Court in Ex Parte Grossman, supra, evidently
based its decision on the historical argument, in the light of the common law, and upon
established practice in this class of cases. (1925) 24 Micn. L. Rv. 189.
28. Arguments have been presented in favor of and in opposition to extending this
executive power to embrace criminal contempts. In favor of the president's power to
pardon such offenses, it is urged that since the king had this power under the common
law, and the president is vested with the same powers, he also can pardon criminal con-
tempts. Against the president's power, it is contended that a criminal contempt is an
offense against the court alone. (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 836, and cases cited therein.
It has also been suggested that the power to pardon should be limited to such con-
tempts as are provided for by statute, since the contempt process is merely incidental
to the enforcement of the criminal law. The proposed limitation, however, would exclude
the large class of contempts for offending the dignity of the courts where the likelihood
of judicial abuse is greatest and where there is most need for such a check as is provided
for by an executive pardon. See Comment (1923) 34 YArP, L. J. 312, 316.
29. "An amnesty," says Vattel, "is a perfect oblivion of the past." VATTE, LAW or
NAnoNs (1858) Bk. 4, c. 2, § 20 p. 439. Amnesty is general; pardon is special. Pardons,
therefore, are granted to individual criminals by name; amnesties to classes of offenders,
or communities. They differ not in kind, but the number they severally affect. See
United States v. Hughes, 175 Fed. 238, 242 (W. D. Pa. 1892); I Bisnop, Nr-w
CPou N Lr LAw (9th ed. 1923) 644. But, "it is of little service to assert or deny an
analogy between amnesty and pardon, . . . 'the distinction between them is one rather
of philological interest than of legal importance'." See Burdick v. United States, 236
U. S. 79, 94 (1915).
30. Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall. 154 (U. S. 1871); Pargoud v. United States,
13 Wall. 156 (U. S. 1871); Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147 (U. S. 1872) (where
a pardon was applied even to aliens, residing in the United States, who gave aid and
comfort to the rebellion). But see, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 601 (1896) (this
executive power has never been held to take from Congress the power to pass acts of
general amnesty).
31. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890) (Guano Island Act of 1856 held con-
stitutional). See Jenkins v. Collard, 146 U. S. 546, 561 (1891). With regard to the
manner of allowing pardons, it will be observed that a pardon by act of parliament Is
more beneficial than by the king's charter, for a man is not bound to plead it, but the
court must ex officio take notice of it; neither can he lose the benefit of it by his ladhes
or negligence as he may of the king's charter of pardon. 2 Coo.EY, BrmCsToNE (4th ed.
1899) 1528.
32. See note 37, infra.
33. Chapman v. Scott, 10 F. (2d) 156 (D. C. Conn. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U. S.
657 (1926). Commutation may be defined as the power to change a greater punishment into
a lesser punishment of which both are known to the law. See Lee v. Murphy, 22 Gratt. 789,
798 (Va. 1872) ; see People ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 133 App. Div. 179, 181, 117 N. Y. Supp.
524, 526 (2d Dep't 1909) (changing a death sentence to life imprisonment held to be a com-
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extension is logically sound for the plenary power must necessarily embrace
the lesser power.34 The power to suspend sentence, on the other band, is
by common law, essentially a judicial power, and its exercise by the judiciary,
therefore, is not in conflict with the executive power to grant reprieves and
pardons.35 But both the president and the governor are vested, by express
grant, with the right to issue reprieves.30
Validity of the Pardoning Power
In the Constitution of the United States, and in most of the state consti-
tutions, the pardoning power is there, in express, general terms, and by con-
struction, since the greater includes the lesser power, it may be either absolute
or conditional.37  This is true also in England.38  The pardoning executive
mutation). The degree of punishment, however, is not determinable by the individual prefer-
ence of the convict, but by the common juigment of mankind. See People ex rd. Patrick
v. Frost, 133 App. Div. 179, 182, 117 N. Y. Supp. 524, 527 (2d Dep't 1909). See also,
notes 4S and 49, infra.
34. See Chapman v. Scott, 10 F. (2d) 156, 159 (D. C. Conn. 1925); Matter of Charles,
115 Kan. 323, 327, 222 Pac. 606, 60S (1924). But, a commutation is essentially different
from a pardon. See notes 48 and 49, mifra.
35. 3 WmLouommy, CosTnsm'unox (2d ed. 1929) 1495. At least one jurisdiction holds
that a statute authorizing a court to suspend the execution of a sentence for an indefinite
time does not infringe upon the pardoning power of the chief executive. State v. Starwich,
119 Wash. 561, 206 Pac. 29 (1922) (granting court power to suspend sentence indefinitely
in the case of a first offender). Contra: United States v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (C. C. Idaho
1891) ; State v. Jacksop, 143 Aiss. 745, 109 So. 724 (1926) (a statute empowering a court
to suspend sentence indefinitely is unconstitutional as a flagrant invasion of the pardoning
power); State v. Anderson, 43 S. D. 630, 181 N. W. 839 (1921); (1927) 36 Y=Ax L. J. 573.
36. U. S. Cozsr. Art. II, § 2, c. 1, and N. Y. Coxsr. art. IV, § S. The distinction
between a reprieve and a suspension of sentence, although the words are sometimes tued
interchangeably, is that reprieve postpones the execution to a day certain, whereas a
suspension is for an indefinite time. See Matter of Buchanan, 146 N. Y. 264, 273, 40
N. E. S83, 886 (1895). Nor is a re-sentencing necessary in the case of a reprieve, for the
right to execute the sentence on the appointed day inheres in the power to fix a day
to which a reprieve shall extend. See Matter of Buchanan, 146 N. Y. 264, 274, 40 N. E.
883, 886 (1895).
In England, it has been stated that "a reprieve is a withdrawing of sentence for an
interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended." 2 Coor.y, Brcr'sro:,m (4th ed.
1899) 1523. Reprieves were frequent in the following cases: where it was the will of
the presiding judge; from legal necessity, as where a woman who is capitally convicted,
pleads her pregnancy; where the offender has become non compos mentis. Id. at 1524.
37. 1 Bismop, NwEvr CaAL Law (8th ed. 1892) 555; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307
(U. S. 1856) (presidential offer to change death sentence, conditioned upon an acceptance
of imprisonment for life); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (U. S. 1872) (a pardon
and restoration of captured and abandoned property conditioned upon the taking and
keeping inviolate of an oath, and upon making application for the restoration of the
property within two years); see also, Lee v. Murphy, 22 Grat. 789, 798 (Va. 1872);
United States v. WVlson, 7 Pet. 150, 161 (U. S. 1833).
38. "... The king may extend his mercy upon what terms he pleases; and may annex
to his bounty a condition either precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof
the validity of the pardon will depend; and this by the common law. Which prerogative
1937]
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may annex to his offer of pardon, then, any conditions that he may see fit
to impose, either precedent,3 9 or subsequent.40  The only restriction upon this
exercise of authority is that the condition must not be impossible of fulfill-
ment, criminal or illegal in nature.41 One condition that has been imposed
and sustained is that a prisoner shall permanently leave his state or country;
42
another is that the pardoned offender shall abstain from the use of intoxi-
cating liquor for a fixed interval of time.43  If the grantee of such mercy
is daily exerted in the pardon of felons, on condition of being confined to hard labour
for a stated time, or of transportation to some foreign country for life, or for a term
of years." 2 COOLEY, BLACKSTONE (4th ed. 1899) 1527-1528.
39. In re Ruh], 20 Fed. Cas. No. 12,124 (D. C. Nev. 1878) (on payment of fines and
costs); Kavalin v. White, 44 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) (on condition that the
prisoner be deported from the United States); Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109
(1883) (on condition that the prisoner leave, the state of California).
40. United States v. Six Lots of Ground, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,299 (C. C. La. 1872)
(on condition that the grantee permanently refrain from pressing all claims to property
and proceeds thereof, forfeited and sold by judicial decree); Kavalin v. White, 44 F. (2d)
49 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) (on the proviso that the prisoner never returns to the United
States); Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883) (on condition that the person
pardoned remains permanently without California).
41. See United States v. Six Lots of Ground, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,299, at 1098 (C. C. La.
1872), aff'd, 91 U. S. 21 (1875); Kavalin v. White, 44 F. (2d) 49, 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930);
Ex parte Prout, 12 Idaho 494, 498, 86 Pac. 275, 276 (1906); 1 BisHoP, Naiw CgLUMAL
LAW (8th ed. 1892) § 915.
With reference to illegal, immoral or impossible conditions, it has been stated that "If
the condition is of a sort not permissible, it is void, and the pardon is absolute." I Bisuop,
NEW CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) 659. But, it seems clear that by declaring a condition
precedent void, no such result should follow. See Canadian Prisoner's Case, 5 M. & W. 32,
49, 151 Eng. Reprints 15, 22 (1839) (if the condition upon which alone the pardon wa
granted be void, the pardon must also be void). • That it should become absolute in the
case of a void condition subsequent is supported by some authority. Taylor v. State, 41
Tex. Cr. R. 148, 51 S. W. 1106 (1899) (a pardon in which the governor reserved the
right of revocation if the grantee violated any of the criminal laws of the state, held,
condition void, pardon absolute); People v. Pease, 3 Johns. 333 (N. Y. 1803) (a proviso
that a pardon was not to relieve the grantee of legal disabilities arising from his conviction,
held, condition void, pardon absolute). Such decisions apparently rest upon a conception
of pardons as of the nature of contracts or deeds. But the modern tendency is to regard
them as acts in the interest of public welfare, wholly independent of the will of the
prisoner. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S. 480, 486 (1927). To construe any expressly
conditioned pardon as absolute is a perversion of the intent of the executive and creates
an uncontemplated danger to the public. The alternative of holding it invalid leaves it
open to the executive to grant a new absolute, or properly conditioned pardon as he sees
fit. (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 399.
42. The condition that the person pardoned shall depart from and remain without
the state or country is not illegal. Kavalin v. White, 44 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930)
(banishment from the United States); Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S. W. 106 (1895);
State v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W. 1065 (1893); People v. Potter, 1 Parker Cr. R.
47 (N. Y. 1846) (deportation from the United States).
43. People v. Burns, 77 Hun 92, 28 N. Y. Supp. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 143 N. Y.
665, 39 N. E. 21 (1894).
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violates the condition, then the pardon shall be void, and the original, un-
expired sentence may be enforced.44
Furthermore, it has been the universal custom, both in England and America,
for the king and the president to exercise this power at any time after the
commission of the offense, either before, during, or after the judicial pro-
ceeding.45  But the governor of a state may not exercise his corresponding
power until after conviction.46 While a presidential pardon may follow im-
mediately the commission of an offense, it may never antecede the offense,
for that would be an attempt to annul the law of the land, and an encroach-
ment upon powers exclusively legislative in character.47
It has been the rule from time immemorial that a pardon must be delivered
and accepted in order to become effective 48 However, a commutation of
sentence, by the president or governor, may be imposed upon the offender
without his consent, and even against his will.4 9  Perhaps, one of the most
noteworthy recent cases, exemplifying the application of a presidential com-
mutation is that of Chapman v. ScottY0 After Chapman was convicted of the
federal crime of robbing the mails, he was sentenced to a twenty-five year
term in a federal penitentiary, from which he soon escaped. While thus at
large, he committed murder in the State of Connecticut for which he was
tried and sentenced to die. To expedite his execution by the State, it was
necessary to nullify the unexpired federal sentence. In order to accomplish
this purpose, President Coolidge officially commuted his federal sentence to
the term already served, prior to his escape. Chapman refused to accept the
document, contending that it was a pardon, to the validity of which his
44. People v. Potter, 1 Parker Cr. R. 47 (N. Y. 1846); People v. Burns, 77 Hun 92,
23 N. Y. Supp. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1S94), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 665, 39 N. E. 21 (1894); 1 Bisnop,
Naw Can=AL LAw (9th ed. 1923) 659; GILBERT, N. Y. Con or CeM. Poc. (1936)
§ 696.
45. See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wail. 333, 3S0 (U. S. 1867); 1 Bisnop, Nnv, Cnrmm;,%. L,
(9th ed. 1923) 647; 9 HALSBuRY's LAWS or EN;rr .ND (1909) 444.
46. See note 20, supra. The term "conviction," appearing in the state constitutions
has in itself provoked no little conflict in its interpretation. Commonwealth v. Lockwood,
109 Mass. 323 (1872) (meaning after a verdict of guilty and before sentence); Ex parte
White, 28 Okla. Cr. R. 180, 230 Pac. 522 (1924) (denoting the final judgment of the trial
court upon a plea or verdict of guilty); Snodgrass v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. R. 615, 150
S. W. 162 (1912).
47. 1 BisHoP, Naw Cna=AL LAw (8th ed. 1899) 547.
48. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U. S. 1833); Burdick v. United States, 236
U. S. 79 (1915). Cf. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S. 480 (1927); Matter of Charles, I15
Kan. 323, 222 Pac. 606 (1924); 3 WInLouGnRy, Co. srxrruox (2d ed. 1929) 1494.
49. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S. 480 (1927) (president's commutation); Chapman
v. Scott, 10 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. AL 10th, 1925), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 657 (1926); People
ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 133 App. Div. 179, 117 N. Y. Supp. 524 (2d Dep't 1909) (gov-
ernor's commutation); Matter of Charles, 115 Kan. 323, 222 Pac. 606 (1924); see also
(1927) 41 Hnv. L. REv. 98 (commenting on the doctrine expressed in Biddle v. Perovich,
supra). For a more exhaustive discussion of commutations and pardons, regarding the
element of acceptance, see (1926) 26 COL. L. Ray. 624; (1926) 35 YAL L. J. 1010, and
cases cited therein.
50. 10 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 10th, 1925), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 657 (1926).
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acceptance was vital. The court found, however, that it was not an executive
pardon, but a commutation of sentence, for the effectiveness of which an ac-
ceptance was not essential. The necessity for acceptance in the case of a
pardon is usually based on two distinct grounds: first, that a pardon is a
deed, and like every deed, must be delivered and accepted to be valid; secondly,
that taking advantage of a pardon imputes a confession of a crime, hence to
make a pardon binding without an acceptance would be forcing a person to
admit guilt though innocent.51
The element of delivery itself has provoked no little controversy in judicial
determination in the past. Thus, it has been held that a delivery to a mar-
shal was not a delivery to the prisoner intended to be benefitted thereby,52
while, in some states, delivery to the warden or prison-keeper is presumptively
complete, apparently based upon the theory that he is customarily the pris-
oner's agent for acceptance. 53  But it is submitted that this rule should not
be extended so as to permit a magnanimous warden to bind inextricably an
unwilling prisoner. While, therefore, several jurisdictions regard delivery to
the warden as delivery to the prisoner, because of the beneficial character of
the instrument, it would seem at times to be tantamount to imposing a prin-
cipal-agent relationship upon the offender, where no agent for acceptance was
in fact appointed. After delivery and acceptance, however, an absolute par-
don becomes irrevocable, 4 although prior to actual delivery, it may be re-
voked by the pardoning depositary.", A pardon procured by fraud, exercised
51. (1915) 13 MIcE. L. REv. 427-428. In Alabama, it has been held that acceptance
of a plenary pardon will be presumed where there is no evidence to rebut such presumption.
Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517 (1883). The acceptance of a conditional pardon is deemed
voluntary and not under duress. See Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307, 316 (U. S. 1855);
In re Greathouse, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,741, at 1062 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1864).
52. In re DePuy, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,814 (S. D. N. Y. 1869). "The marshall
was in this case no more than the messenger of the President, . . . If the President can
arrest the mission of the messenger when the messenger has departed but ten feet from
the door of the presidential mansion, he can arrest such mission at any time before the
messenger delivers the pardon to the warden of the prison." Id. at 512.
53. Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517 (1883); Ex parte Reno, 66 Mo. 266 (1877); Common-
wealth v. HalIoway, 44 Pa. 210 (1863). However, a pardon to take effect in the future
is not delivered, though it is sent and received by the warden, where it is recalled before
the day on which it was to become effective. Ex parte Ray, 18 Okla. Cr. R. 167, 193 Pac.
635 (1920) (by mistake of the warden, the governor issued a pardon, which was revoked
before the day for effectuation thereof).
54. Ex parte Reno, 66 Mo. 266 (1877); Rosson v. Stehr, 23 Tex. App. 287, 4 S. W.
897 (1887); E parte Rice, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 587, 162 S. W. 891 (1913) (governor's condi-
tional pardon cannot be revoked except because of a violation of the conditions by the
grantee); See Ex parte Ray, 18 Okla. Cr. R. 167, 181, 193 Pac. 635, 640 (1920).
55. In rei DePuy, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,814 (S. D. N. Y. 1869). And it has been
held in at least one jurisdiction that a commutation may be revoked at any time prior
to the actual discharge of the prisoner from custody. People ex rel. Presser v. Lawes,
221 App. Div. 692, 225 N. Y. Supp. 53 (2d Dep't 1929). A sound solution for this prob-
len depends upon an appreciation of the exact nature of a commutation as a social dis-
pensation of grace, the prisoner's interest being weighed against the public interest. Clearly,
the public interest involved is sufficient to retain complete control over the prisoner until
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upon the pardoning power, on the other hand, is void, both in'England and
in America, and subject to revocation, even after delivery, by the proper
authority,5 6 but the converse rule generally obtains where a pardon is issued
through mistake.5 7
The Effect of Pardons Generally
Perhaps, no one judicial utterance has been more frequently quoted,5 3 and
yet more sharply attacked and criticized for its comprehensiveness and boldness
than that appearing in Ex parte Garland, describing the effect of executive
forgivenessY9 Chief Justice Taft stated, in substance, that a pardon releases
actual discharge from the custody of the state. (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 670. Cf. note 52,
supra.
56. Commonwealth v. Halloway, 44 Pa. 210 (1863) (pardon issued upon forged letters
from the War Department to the executive void); contra: Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio
377 (183) (this proposition was denied as applied to pardons fully delivered and accepted,
when the validity of the pardon was indirectly attacked for fraud in an habcas corpus
proceeding).
According to the English view, a pardon is void whenever the king has not been truly
and fully apprised of the nature of the case and the state of the proceedings. 1 BLisoP,
NEw CRa La LAw (Sth ed. 1892) 548; 3 Coxn, INsTn=rrEs 238.
Again it was held in one jurisdiction that a court, on habeas corpus proceeding, is
without jurisdiction to refer the issue of fraud to a referee, and furthermore, that a
pardon could only be revoked for fraud by a direct proceeding in equity for that pecific
purpose. Ex parte Bess, 152 S. C. 410, 150 S. E. 54 (1929). But this case, in holding
that the issue of fraud may not be determined in a habeas corpus proceeding, is contrary
to the weight of authority. (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 128, and cases cited therein. Again,
it has been held that a pardon obtained by fraud may be cancelled in an equitable pro-
ceeding at the suit of the public prosecutor, and that the attorney-general is the proper
representative of the governor for this purpose. Rathbun v. Baumel, 196 Iowa 1233, 191
N. W. 297 (1922). See (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 888. Cf. E parte Rice 72 Tex. Cr. R.
587, 162 S. W. 891 (1913) (the governor cannot revoke a conditional pardon because
after-discovered evidence leads him to believe that his clemency was il-advised).
57. Es parte Ray, 18 OkIa. Cr. R. 167, 193 Pac. 635 (1920); (1921) 34 Mnv. L. Rmv.
678. It is unlikely that American courts would go so far as to hold a pardon invalid
for mistake, especially when it was caused by the honest misrepresentation of a parson
totally unconnected with the interest of the prisoner, to wit, the warden. Id. at 679.
58. See Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92, 103 (189); Singleton
v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 302, 21 So. 21, '22 (1896); United States v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga.
344, 363 (1868); People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 28S, 294, 36 N. E.
3S6, 388 (1894); Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ore. 568, 577 (1870); Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa.
316, 322, 32 At!. 424, 426 (1895); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 43 (1833).
59. Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HAnV. L. Rnv. 647, criticizing
the paradoxical language of Ex parte Garland, supra, in describing the omnipotent effect
of a pardon. See also, In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,234, at 922 (C. C. D. Ore. 1878),
stating, in reference to the description mentioned above, "This is probably as strong and
unqualified a statement of the scope and efficacy of a pardon as can be found in the
books. And yet I do not suppose the opinion is to be understood as going the length
of holding that while the party is to be deemed innocent of the crime by reason of the
pardon from and after the taking effect thereof, that it is also to be deemed that he
never did commit the crime or was convicted of it."
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the punishment, and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of
the law the offender becomes as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. It was said further to restore him to all his civil rights, to make him,
as it were, a new man, and to give him a new credit and capacity. 60 The English
descriptions of its effect were somewhat more conservative in nature.0 1 Wil-
liston,62 moreover, in demonstrating how the American courts have misinter-
preted precedent, as found in English law, declares that Bracton's idea 5 was
not that the offense was regarded by law as not having been committed, or
even as no longer existing, but that the offender, so far as concerned the fiturc,
acquired the capacity of an innocent man.
The courts are unanimous in declaring that no further punishment may be
inflicted in consequence of a pardoned crime, yet in determining what con-
stitutes punishment they are in irreconcilable conflict. An apt illustration of
the divergent opinions in the courts in regard to the effect of a pardon is
afforded by a New York case, People v. Carlesi.64  A New York statute pro-
vided that a person, who, after having been convicted in New York of a
felony, or its equivalent under the laws of any other government, thereafter
commits any crime within the state, will be punished upon conviction as for
a second offense. 5 Carlesi had been convicted, under a federal statute, of
the crime of selling counterfeit coin. He served time, was pardoned, and then
committed forgery in New York. It was held that he could be sentenced for
a second offense under the New York statute,60 on the ground that the addi-
tional punishment imposed was not punishment for the first offense, but a
heavier punishment for the second. 67
60. See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1867).
61. "A pardon is a work of mercy whereby the king, either before attainder, sentence,
or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offense, punishment, execution, right, title,
debt, or duty, temporal or ecclesiastical. All that is forfeited to the king by attainder,
... he may restore by his charter." 3 COKE, INSTiTUTES 233 d.
"... The effect of pardon by the king, is to make the offender a new man; to acquit
him of all corporeal penalties and forfeitures annexed to that offense for which he obtains
his pardon; and not so mucht to restore his former, as to give him a new credit and
capacity." (Italics mine.) 2 CooLmr, BLACKSTOCNE (4th ed. 1899) 1528. See also, 6
HAISBuRY, LAWS Or ENGLAND (1909) 406-407.
62. Williston, Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HAv. L. REV. 647, 650. He
declares, further, that the decision of Cuddington v. Wilkins, Hob. 67, 81 (1615), 80 Eng.
Reprints 216 (1615), has probably been the main foundation of this unwarranted im-
pression that, after a pardon, the law could not thereafter see the convict's guilt. Id. at 651.
63. 2 Twi ss's TRANSLAT ON 371.
64. 208 N. Y. 547 (1914), aff'd, 233 U. S. 51 (1914).
65. N. Y. Pmxr. LAw (1909) § 1941, amended by L. 1936, c. 70, § 1; L. 1936, c.
328, § 6 to include punishment for second and third offenses.
66. People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1917) semble;
cf. People ex rel. Jobissy v. Murphy, 244 App. Div. 834, 279 N. Y. Supp. 762 (3d Dep't
1935), holding that under an habitual criminal statute a pardoned offense constituted a
conviction, but a suspended sentence did not. The decisions are in conflict, however,
as to whether a pardoned offense may be considered a previous conviction under an
habitual criminal statute. (1936) 5 FoRDmAm L. REv. 166, and cases cited therein.
67. See Note (1913) 13 CoL. L. Rxv. 418, 419 stating, that the jurisdictions are divided
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Under other circumstances, where disabilities and disqualifications follow a
conviction, the courts have provided varying results for the effect of a pardon,
depending upon the right or privilege involved. Thus, for example, a pardon
will restore a witness to competency, 5 though his conviction may still be
urged to affect his credibility, 9 but a crime, even though pardoned, will con-
stitute adequate ground for the removal of a public officer."0 When called
upon to determine whether a pardoned crime will constitute a foundation for
disbarment proceedings, the jurisdictions have found themselves in a confusing
position.7 ' But certainly the integrity of the legal profession can in no way
be enhanced by welcoming back into its fold such erring members. One who
is pardoned, moreover, cannot obtain damages for his imprisonment.'-2  In like
manner, an applicant for admission to citizenship may be rejected on account
of a pardoned conviction.7 3 Furthermore, at least one jurisdiction, though in
opposition to the weight of authority, takes the view that a pardon restores
only civil rights, and not political rights such as suffrage.7 4 Again, the presi-
on this question also, and further declaring that some jurisdictions maintain that the
pardon of the first offense obliterates it, so that, in legal effect, the later crime is the
first offense.
68. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450 (1892); Thompson v. United States, 202 Fed.
401 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913); Roberson v. Wocdfork, 155 Ky. 206, 159 S. W. 793 (1913);
Diehi v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 At. 424 (1895). This is true even though the pardon
is not given until after the convict has served his sentence also. People v. Bowen, 43
Cal. 439 (1872). While modern decisions generally hold that a pardon removes this
incapacity, some jurisdictions, following English precedent, make an exception in the case
of perjury. A few United States cases have accepted this distinction between perjury and
other crimes. Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, 1 Parker Cr. R. 241 (N. Y. 1851). See also
Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30, 35 (N. Y. 1816); Rex v. Ford, 2 Salk, 691, 691,
91 Eng. Reprints 585 (1700). Coaltrlz: Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 AfU. 424
(1895); see also, Roberson v. Woodfork, 155 Ky. 206, 206, 159 S. IV. 793, 794 (1913)
(provided it is properly introduced into evidence).
69. United States v. Jones, 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 451 (N. Y. 1824); Baum v. Clau-e,
5 Hill 196 (N. Y. 1843).
70. State v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S. W. (2d) 419 (1935) (a person convicted of
embezzling public funds is ineligible to hold the state office of county judge, despite
presidential pardon); State ex rel. Webb v. Parks, 122 Tenn. 230, 122 S. W. 977 (1909)
(a governor's pardon of a justice of the peace, convicted of oppression in office, ineffectual
in restoring that office). Nor will offices once forfeited be restored by executive clemency.
State v. Carson, 27 Ark. 469 (1872); Commonwealth v. Fugate, 2 Leigh. 724 (Va. 1830).
71. The majority view, holding in the affirmative, reasons that where there is a pardon,
there is an admission of guilt, and that a pardon does not wipe out this guilt. Nelson
v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337 (1908); In the Matter of - , an
Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (1881). The minority contention, on the other hand, claims
that the pardon obliterates both the conviction and the guilt. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333 (U. S. 1866); Ex parte Crisler, 159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103 (1931); Scott v. State,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 343, 25 S. W. 337 (1894); see also (1936) S Forn~mt L. Rnv. 166, 168.
72. Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899) stating, that a pardon
relieves the offender of all unenforced penalties, but has no retroactive effect on the
judgment of conviction. See also, Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 153 (1877).
73. In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,234, at 923 (C. C. Ore. 1878).
74. Rhode Island refuses to restore the right of suffrage. Opinion of Judges, 4 R. I.
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dential pardoning power must carry with it, as incident to it, the power to
restore penalties and forfeitures, accruing to the United States, from the of-
fense,75 but this restoration will not obtain where the forfeited property has
become vested in third persons other than the United States.70 It is obvious,
therefore, that a pardon does not in reality remove all legal consequences of
the crime, nor can it completely obliterate the fact of its commission, or the
moral guilt of the offender.
77
Conclusion
Perhaps, in no other activity of our system of government has there been
proportionally more adverse criticism than in the exercise of the pardoning
prerogative. The reason for this is probably that it is impossible to satisfy
all persons who are concerned in the punishment of those who have been con-
victed of crime.7 8 It was never intended that the pardoning power, moreover,
should be exercised in favor of a large proportion of convicted persons.70 On
the contrary, executive clemency was designed to be applied in exceptional.
cases only, for example, those where there has been a miscarriage of justice,
or where strict enforcement of the law has resulted in unforeseen hardship,
or where the sentence was unduly severe and disproportionate to the crime
committed.80 The necessity for the existence of such a power cannot be more
aptly expressed than in the words of Chief Justice Taft, in EX parte Grossman.
-"The administration of justice by the courts is not always wise or certainly
considerate of circumstances which properly mitigate guilt. To afford a
remedy, it has always been thought essential in popular governments, as well
as in monarchies, to vest in some other authority than the courts power to
ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judgments. It is a check entrusted
to the executive for special purposes."813
583 (1758). Generally, however, a pardon restores the right to vote which has been
forfeited. Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S. W. 407 (1892); see State ex rel. Collins v.
Lewis, 111 La. 693, 35 So. 816 (1904) (pardon restores juror to competency). But, a
crime although pardoned will form adequate basis for the refusal of a driving license.
Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div. 425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dep't 1923). And an
accessory to a felony may be tried and convicted although the principal has been par-
doned, or otherwise discharged. N. Y. PExAL LAW (1909) § 1934. Moreover, a pardon
granted to a person sentenced to life imprisonment does not restore that person to the
rights of a previous marriage, or to the guardianship of a child, the issue of such marriage.
N. Y. Dowr- REr. LAw (1909) § 58.
75. Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766 (U. S. 1868) (relief from forfeiture so far as
the right accrues to the United States granted); Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S. 474
(1875) (penalty and forfeiture remitted).
76. Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149 (1877); see 1 Bisnop, NEw CR=Arm LAW
(8th ed. 1892) 551, and 553.
77. Note (1913) 13 CoL.. L. REv. 418, 420.'
78. Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 183, 188.
79. Cf. note 1, supra.
80. See Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 120 (1925); Morris, Some Phases ol the
Pardoning Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 183, 189.
81. 267 U. S. 87, 120-121 (1925).
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In short, then, it may be fairly stated that the pardoning power granted
by our national and state constitutions is a symbol of enlightened civilization,
and that its wise and judicious exercise by presidents and governors has raised
the standard of our democracy toward the end that justice is finally adminis-
tered in mercy, according to the highest ideals of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.P
82. Morris, Somre Phases of the Pardoning Po-wer (1926) 12 A. B. A. 3. 183, 190.
